In place of the all-encompassing trichotomy, Edley proposes an alternative decisional methodology--"sound governance"-that requires viewing the three paradigms as an integrated trio. 6 Ultimately, Edley wants the "project" of administrative law to "move away from its anachronistic focus on discretion and face directly the problems of sound governance." ' 7 And sound governance, he tells us, is a job not only of agencies but of courts. Indeed, in his book, he writes: "[M]y argument is that the proper judicial motivation is sound governance and that sound governance should be the engine of judicial innovation and action." 8 It is clearly hard to oppose a concept such as sound governance, but I find that as a heuristic device it is not helpful. In fact, I suspect that Edley's sound governance theory is in some respects a metaphor for that dreaded thing-judicial activism. Perhaps Edley believes that by cutting the constraints of separation of powers, law and politics will become one: the trichotomy will collapse into itself, with the judiciary assuming ultimate authority. 9 In this, Edley assumes that federal judges would be better guardians of public policy than, for example, the Commissioners of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) or the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). My objection to this contention is the same as Judge Wald's: It is not judges' work to invite a "'dialogue' between courts and agencies on the norms of sound governance."' 0 As Chevron correctly points out, " [t] he responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones... ." 11 Thus, "policy arguments are more properly addressed to legislators or administrators, not to judges." 1 2 That work is better suited for think tank organizations, such as the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution, or the Heritage Foundation. Indeed, I would argue that Edley's version of administrative law is not law, but rather politics; he attempts to pull back into the law school what has been slipping away to the Kennedy School. His trichotomy is the project of public policy, not of administrative law.
As a matter of political theory, I find it difficult to understand why Edley assigns the sound governance project to the judicial "pew" rather than to the pew of politics and public policy. Although many of the 6. See C. EDLEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAU-CRACY 213 (1990 questions that Edley asks of the sound governance project are legitimate, they are questions for students of public policy, political science, and legislatures, not for courts. It is the job of Congress to wrestle with the relationships between the three legs of the tripod. It is Congress, acting within the context of the Constitution, that directs judges as to when a particular paradigm should be utilized. 13 As Vermont Yankee 1 4 points out, it is in one sense Congress's job to say when it wants to ensure additional procedural "fairness" through the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
1 5 And it is Congress's job to say when it wants agencies to incorporate policy (Edley would say political) considerations in their decisionmaking process. 16 Like it or not, judges are not trained either in policy analysis or in scientific truth-seeking. Indeed, in a recent review of Edley's book, Tom Sargentich suggests that agency fact-finding receives a high degree of deference from courts on the grounds that such findings result from a method of reasoning distinct from that to which courts are accustomed.'
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(Perhaps the appropriate word should be "qualified" rather than "accustomed.") Lack of competence may not be an institutional characteristic in the hallowed halls of Harvard, but the question of institutional competence ought not be ignored in considering the nature and limits of judicial review of agency action.
Although Edley's obsession with the judiciary as the key to sound governance is questionable, I do not mean to imply that the judiciary cannot make positive contributions to the sound governance project. Congress has often failed in its responsibility by writing ambiguous and inconsistent statutes forged in the political to and fro of the legislative process. Indeed, the ambiguity is not always inadvertent, but sometimes actually intentional. The sad fact is that Congress often accepts innumerable linguistic ambiguities to get a piece of legislation passed, and then leaves it to the courts to decipher its meaning.
If Congress were more disciplined in the making of statutes, the pressure on the judiciary to engage in an overweening activism would significantly diminish. I humbly suggest that if judges find the statutory language incoherent, they might say so. Indeed, they might even say that "we can't decide this because it is incoherent." I think such actions would spur Congress to go back and see how to improve the statute. Rather than seek out less and less credible legislative history to aid in statutory interpretation, courts might state: "Look, we are going to hold off the final opinion for six months to see if Congress clarifies, by statute, what it meant." This does not mean that judges should refuse to apply a statute. By stating that a statute is inexplicable, however, Congress's attention will focus on the need for more careful drafting and a more accountable legislative process.
Implementation of this kind of "appropriate" judicial activity can be seen in the efforts of Robert Katzmann, in concert with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, to create better judicial-congressional interaction."' Katzmann has set up an informal arrangement with the Circuit by which the court sends to the Governance Institute cases that criticize statutes as utterly confusing or indecipherable. The Institute then collates these opinions and sends them to relevant House and Senate Committees. After a year in operation, the results of this process indicate that the concept is worth exploring, and perhaps ought to be institutionalized in some official government bodybe it the Judicial Conference, a congressional committee, or the Administrative Conference of the United States.'
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One problem with Edley's strategy is his extremely dense, and at times impenetrable, language. For example, take the following con-clusory statement found in his book, Administrative Law: "[T]he posttrichotomy model of law would transmute the deathless discretion permitted and generated by the present doctrinal structure into a different form of discretion, centered on the evolution and application of norms directly tied to a modernist objective." ' 20 Fortunately, Edley later restates his vision of the future: "The central aspect of this evolutionary image is partnership. The court joins the agency and the legislature to confront directly the problems of governance in a complicated and uncertain world." '21 When the APA was passed in 1946, it was intended to place a "floor" on some elements of procedural fairness under federal agency processes, while preserving the essential benefits of administrative action-speed, low cost, informality, and agency expertise. Over the years, these processes have taken on increasing formality, complexity, and, often, rigidity. Although traditional administrative procedures are certainly fair (and perceived as such), they can be expensive and time-consuming. Delay is often the rule rather than the exception. The high cost of participation in the administrative process or court review can freeze out smaller, less affluent interests. Formality also tends to place a premium on procedural expertise. Citizens who may be quite effective when informally attempting to persuade their colleagues or friends of the justness of their cause can become reticent when placed in a forum that forces them to present their views within procedural constraints designed for law school graduates. With the passage of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 199022 and its companion Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990,23 we see a renewed congressional emphasis on restoring those important benefits while adding a somewhat new dimension-an enhanced participation by private parties in the actual decisionmaking of the government. Clearly, Edley believes that contemporary administrative law is hung up on an "antidiscretion project," that is to say, the effort to make the administrative state "safe for liberty and palatable to democracy only when constraints are imposed on administrative discretion through judge-made law and congressionally enacted procedural safeguards." 25 Edley also believes that the purpose of constraining administrative discretion is to protect "the legitimacy of blurred institutional roles." 26 This is a conceptual mistake. The constraint of discretion does not depend on "murky separation-of-powers constructs." '27 Indeed, the two have nothing to do with each other. The effort to constrain administrative discretion flows from traditional concerns for asserting the rule of law. It is the reason why the magisterial A.V. Dicey claimed there could be no administrative law in England, because administrative law ran counter to judicial supremacy and the rule of law. 28 The less formality, the greater the administrative flexibility, and the greater the danger of agency impropriety-or so the real anti-discretion project goes.
The key to discussing discretion is to analyze which areas of discretion are licit and which are illicit. Consider, for example, the problem of grant procedures. The question of how government grants should be distributed underscores the extent to which administrative law is not necessarily a matter of technocratic expertise, but of political choices-and that such choices can be licit.
Edley's trichotomy correctly notes that there is science, and there is politics. 29 The challenge is how to integrate politics into administration, and not, as Edley suggests, to politicize the courts. 30 The key is bureaucratic accountability. Courts play a role, but ultimately elected officials-whether in the legislative or executive branch-should be held accountable because they are elected by the people. The trichotomy, of course, covers the waterfront. And I am certain that the efforts to integrate politics and administration, like many others, can be accommodated within it. It is, I believe, where the action is and should be in administrative law. engage in deference, not due to a theory of presumed agency expertise, but because of "separation of powers" and democratic accountability considerations. Chevron teaches us that courts should defer to administrative agencies in the case of statutory ambiguity because statutory analysis is less of a scientific process than the explication of a range of legitimate meanings, each representing different policy options. In such circumstances, in Judge Laurence Silberman's words, "agencies-even the independent ones-have superior political standing to the life-tenured federal judiciary in performing that policymaking function. '33 Agencies, unlike judges, have a more direct relationship with the democratic process. They are part of the executive branch that, whatever its faults, holds the institutional processes to reflect popular will.
Nevertheless, I must say to Edley, "don't knock the 'antidiscretion' project," or (following Kenneth Culp Davis) what I would more fairly call the "structured discretion" project. 34 It has served freedom well. As one watches with some awe the flood tide of freedom spill over into Eastern Europe, one is struck by the efforts of lawyers in those countries to recreate western notions of holding officials accountable to the rule of law. Indeed, even the Soviet Union has endeavored to include judicial review of administrative agency conduct in its new package of legal reforms. 35 This notion that every man is subject to the law, that the "humblest is the peer of the most powerful," ' Professor Sunstein proposes that the next generation of administrative law scholarship shift its focus from its "traditional preoccupation with the judiciary to a focus on congressional and bureaucratic processes[, which] remain ill-understood despite the fact that they have far more important roles in government regulation." 4 0 In Sunstein's view, regulation can benefit from "strategies that will incorporate an understanding of market forces, promote the democratic character of modem government, and increase international competitiveness while minimizing undesirable side-effects and reducing regulatory costs." '41 I agree with Sunstein that we must shift our attention away from courts and toward different audiences, such as Congress, administrators, and the public. Instead of concentrating on judicial review as an external constraint on administrative discretion, we must examine regulatory failures of the past to develop policies and processes that will avoid such failures in the future.
Where I differ, however, is that I believe Sunstein's "substance project" can only be successfully addressed by examining the "especially pervasive and often overlooked problem" of administrative structure. 42 In studying issues of structure and process (I consider structure and process as opposite sides of the same coin), judicial review is but one approach. Thus, Sunstein's view of procedure should be seen as a critique 37. R. BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS, act I, at 39 (1960). 38. Id. 39. "Left wing" critics of legal structure have praised the role played by the rule of law in society. As E.P. Thompson, the well-known historian and social critic, has pointed out:
[There is a difference between arbitrary power and the rule of law. We ought to expose the shams and inequities which may be concealed beneath [the] law. But the rule of law itself, the imposing of effective inhibitions upon power and the defense of the citizen from power's all-intrusive claims, seems to me to be an unqualified human good. [V/ol. 1991:671 of the American penchant to equate administrative law with judicial review (an opinion I share).
E. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGINS OF THE BLACK ACT 266 (1975)
At the Administrative Conference, we broadly interpret our mandate to "study the efficiency, adequacy, and fairness of the administrative procedure used by administrative agencies .. . . 43 Our commitment goes beyond judicial review, and focuses on issues of structure and process that lead to the improvement of administrative law. Thus, at the risk of sounding parochial, I would urge that Professor Sunstein supplement his call for reform of administrative substance with what I would label (perhaps facetiously) the process project. 44 This "process project"
should focus on problems of governance (hopefully "sound") that have little or nothing to do with courts. On my own short list of study areas I would include the following:
Congressional Micro-Management
By this I mean the post-Chadha 45 experience on Congressional oversight of the regulatory process, and whether it has fostered a more effective administration. 46 This includes the use of appropriations riders, the oversight hearing, the confirmation process, and other forms of involvement in regulatory process.
Keating Five Redux 4 7
By this I mean the proper response of agencies to congressional inquiries/pressure that inevitably leads to an examination of the role of individual members of Congress representing their constituencies' interests. 48 One example is Senator Robert Dole's (R-Kan.) recent introduc- 48. This is the classic debate over the role of the representative. The Madisonian view suggests that elected officials ought to act as "trustees" of the public interest (if that is definable) "refin [ing] and enlarg[ing] the public views" to "discern the true interest of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations." THE [Vol. 1991:671 tion of legislation that requires public disclosure of congressional inquiries regarding (among other things) ongoing enforcement actions. 
Non-traditional Forms of Bureaucratic Accountability
By this I mean the development of citizen safeguards as ombudsman, 54 qui tam actions 5 6 or whistleblower protection statutes, 5 7 and the use of private attorneys general. 5 8
A Coordinated Regulatory Policy
By this I mean the role of the Office of Management and Budget review system, 5 9 its comparison to state regulatory review programs in such states as Arizona 6° and California, 6 1 the role of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), the roles of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), and other coordinating bodies.
Cost Efficiency in Regulation
By this I mean the use of cost-benefit analysis in decisionmaking, 62 62. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982) (requiring executive branch. agencies, in the context of certain "major rules," to observe, unless precluded by law, specified cost-benefit formulae when regulating and issuing initial and final Regulatory Impact Analyses).
latory law, and a focus on how to provide process in agency adjudication with a sensitivity to cost considerations.
Thus, there exist numerous areas of process and structure that do not involve issues of judicial review. Although I believe that a focus on substance as the future goal for administrative law is valuable, it requires that we study coextensive structures that better effectuate our substantive goals.
Americans tend to accept the given as set in stone. In fact, regulatory structures that can be used to solve a regulatory problem abound. The New Deal saw the growth of multi-member independent regulatory agencies. More recently, the impetus for multi-member commissions has flagged. 6 3 The current trend is to establish separate independent agencies with a single head. For example, Congress has considered transforming the Nuclear Regulatory Commission into a single-member agency 64 and bringing the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission within the executive branch with a single commissioner. 65 Additionally, the Office of Government Ethics was emancipated from the Office of Personnel Management, to provide it with some perceived measure of autonomy. 66 A new preference has emerged toward elevating an agency's stature to cabinet status, as seen most recently with the Department of Veterans Affairs. 67 A similar effort is underway for the EPA. 68 At the same time, Congress has added to the administrative bestiary new regulatory structures reminiscent of the British "quango." 69 These include government-sponsored enterprises, public corporations, commissions, and boards and authorities-all with different responsibilities and different organizational structures. For example, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 70 created the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), giving it primary responsibility for handling cases involving former FSLIC-insured institutions that had been or would be placed in conservatorship or receivership. By statute, the RTC is governed by the FDIC Board of Directors. 7 1 However, Congress created an additional five-member oversight board composed of the Secretary of Treasury, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and two members from outside the government nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
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Some members of Congress have proposed to reformulate the board so that majority control is in the hands of individuals with no other governmental duties. One proposal would reconstitute the RTC board to include nine members. 73 Another would establish a single board of seven voting members. 74 Each of these structural formulations has its advantages and disadvantages. The point, for our purposes, is that "structure has consequences"-consequences regarding efficiency, fairness, and democratic accountability. The effect of structure on each of these values must be weighed in the balance.
In that regard, we must remind ourselves that such "delicately balanced and innovative institutions" 75 must not distend the central princi- pal of the unitary executive. At its root is not only a constitutional doctrine "to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," 76 but a democratic principle: if "the buck stops here," the person who carries the buck must be able to hold bureaucrats accountable. Not all "innovative.. . governmental experiment[s]" 77 in structure will encroach upon the separation of powers principle, but they must first be analyzed from that constitutional perspective.
Nonetheless, I certainly agree with Professor Sunstein's call for the reform of administrative structures motivated by a "strong presumption in favor of flexible, market-oriented, incentive-based regulatory strategies." '78 Professor Sunstein attributes many of the regulatory failures in the United States to "the use of rigid, highly bureaucratized 'commandand-control' regulation. ' 79 He proposes the implementation of performance standards, which I understand to mean "standards that prescribe the regulatory result to be achieved." 80 Their advantage includes leaving regulated entities free to choose or invent "least cost solutions." 81 They foster innovation, produce more flexible results-oriented policy, and are less damaging to competition in the free market. An example is the Consumer Product Safety Commission, which adopted a performance standard requiring a "sharp points" laboratory test for toys and toy parts. 82 This was an easier standard to write and certainly more cost effective than trying to specify myriad design and material options acceptable for toys.
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Performance standards, however, can sometimes be harder to write, harder to administer (both practically and as a matter of legal process), and may provide competitive advantages for larger and more sophisticated firms. 84 Thus, when OSHA changed its fire safety rule dictating 76. U.S. CONST the exact height for mounting fire extinguishers and substituted a performance standard stating that the extinguishers must be "accessible," 8 5 some in the industry complained that the burden of compliance became more difficult. 8 6 Notwithstanding this sort of problem, the federal government has only begun to use performance standards effectively. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), an agency that has hewed rigidly to command-and-control regulation, is just beginning to re-examine the use of performance standards. 87 Such efforts are positive and should be encouraged. 8 8 In addition to performance standards, we must examine the extent to which self-certification works. Consider the Export Administration Act, under which many transaction approvals are completely delegated to exporters. 89 If the checking is performed properly, they can self-certify wholesale. However, if the exporters make even one mistake, then individual validating licenses are required in which every item must be sent before the regulatory agency to certify that the item will not be improperly distributed or used. 90 This is an example of how one can couple corporate self-interest with self-certification to accomplish significant regulatory goals. 91 In that regard I would applaud Sunstein's recognition of the value of risk disclosure as a regulatory device. As Sunstein remarked at the symposium, it provides an incentive to industry to improve so that they do not appear at the bottom of published risk lists.92 Further, the focus on risk information disclosure treats the "object" of a regulation, be it the consumer, employee, or citizen, as a participant in the regulatory process, responsible for receiving facts and weighing the risks. 93 The litigation "explosion" and resulting crisis of "mass justice" have led to the consideration of new structures of administrative adjudication (this, frankly, is the area in which the average citizen is most likely to "experience" administrative law). One example is the lay tribunal, often used in British administrative procedure, which focuses less on precedent and procedural formality and more on the substantive results, with a concomitant restriction of judicial review of fact. 94 Indeed we need to consider whether there are ways to improve front-end procedures in areas like asylum adjudication 95 or social security disability processes 96 and then provide fewer bites at the apple at the back-end of the process. 97 Furthermore, we need to consider where and how proceduralism stands in the way of reform. For example, there is often a failure to examine whether a situation demands emergency fast-track regulatory action. 9 8 We must question our assumptions regarding administrative process and procedure, in spite of the fact that the "rights" revolution caused many to equate more and more procedure with due process fairness. It is hoped that with the passage of the Administrative Dispute 92. Imagine how bank lending practices would improve if the disclosure of bank risk ratios were required.
93. One should not underestimate Sunstein's point that to "require industries to disclose the existence of risks to the public until a regulation has been issued that establishes that the risks are insignificant" will likely cause industry to press for more stringent safety regulations. Sunstein, supra note 41, at 632. I am not certain, however, if such disclosure is in itselfa sufficient regulatory device.
Resolution Act 99 and the Negotiated Rulemaking Act 1°° agencies will take advantage of new mechanisms of administrative process. Indeed, recalling the raison d'etre of the administrative state, we may yet be forced to question whether proceduralism may at times impair both fairness and efficiency.
I will only briefly mention Professor Sunstein's famous statutory "canons." 1 0 1 I believe statutory interpretation has been over-analyzed in recent years. 1 0 2 Although the subject may yet provide grist for the mill of the literary theorist (but I doubt it), it has become far too esoteric for the practicing lawyer and, dare I say, the real-life judge. Except for his discussion of regulatory rationales, Sunstein's Article excises that aspect from his analysis of the regulatory state. My criticism is that Sunstein would not merely read statutes in derogation of the common law, but also to effectuate a host of subjective goals, such as civil rights and environmental values, which are bound up in his understanding of civic virtue. Suffice it to say that Professor Sunstein, like Professor Edley, would require a degree of judicial activism which is rarely practiced, even by its surviving devotees.
My final comments concern Sunstein's support for neo-Republicanism. 10 3 Everybody seems to want to be a neo-Republican. 1 0 4 It is hard to be against a notion that embraces civic virtue. The true meaning of the term emphasizes an individual's role in society as a savior; focusing on people who engage in the public sphere and in the public space as citizens of a republic rather than as individuals engaging in private, selfish, possessive kinds of activity. Although there is much benefit in that approach, I must note that where virtue has reigned--Calvin's Geneva,
